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THE NEW POLITICS.

PARTIES AND MEN.

BY WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN.

NONE of us are entirely content with our political parties as they are. A good many of us hardly ever mention them except to abuse them. But only one prominent American, Mr. W. R. Hearst, has of late years made any persistent effort to get rid of the old ones and substitute new; and he does not seem to have had any great success. No one has seriously proposed that we try to get on without any parties whatsoever. Parties of some sort are the only device we have for making our Government work. We can deal with the issues presented by the new politics only through parties; through the old ones if they do not divide too hopelessly when they come to face those issues; through new ones if they do. In any case, however, we shall at least begin with the old parties.

I will repeat the statement I have made of what seems to me the present task of democracy in America, the problem presented by the new order which has come about in industry and business almost simultaneously with the final coming of the Republic into a sense of the limitations of its material resources. The present task and problem of democracy is twofold: to secure for the state, the people, some effective ultimate control over the natural sources of all wealth; and to secure, in an industrial system no longer controlled by competition, protection and opportunity for the individual.

The contest now forced upon us is, of course, but another form or phase of the immemorial struggle with privilege. But the phase of that struggle upon which we are now entering may, I think, be not unreasonably considered the most important, the most crucial of all. And for this reason: The kind of privilege

with which we must now join battle is the product, not of monarchy or aristocracy or priesthood, but of democracy itself. It has grown up out of a free soil. The new organization of industry into great combinations, which has gone so far towards crushing out competition, began itself in the freest competition; it was in fact accomplished through the methods of competition. First competition, then absorption—that has been the process. But for the freedom which our laws and usage allowed—the free play they gave to all kinds of ability, the opportunity they opened to all kinds of talent—it is doubtful if these tremendous aggregations of energy and wealth and system could have been built up so swiftly. Certainly, no country where the older forms of privilege prevail has ever matched them. Being, therefore, products of a society established in opposition to the entire conception of privilege, they may seem to prove that there is something in the very nature of great human societies which makes for privilege—that there is something, perhaps, in human nature that makes for it. But whatever the fundamental trouble, the root of the evil, may be, it is not entirely unreasonable to hope that this time, since we are dealing with a kind of privilege native to democracy itself, we may eventually get at it. What I mean is that we may eventually find our struggle turning into a warfare with the very life-principle of privilege; that it may, therefore, prove to be the final war—the last of the long series that began either with the first raising up of the head of authority in some pristine democracy or else with the first glimpse of the face of freedom in some original despotism.

That, of course, is a long, long hope; and these are large and bold conceptions. To pass from them to a study of our Democratic and Republican parties of to-day is rather an anti-climax—like turning from Burke or Milton to the newspapers. But I know no other way to be practical.

The tendency in all self-governing or partly self-governing societies is to have at least one party which is distinctly, at any rate habitually, the party of privilege and at least one party which is habitually opposed to privilege. There may be other parties, advocating special causes. One or the other of the two great parties may from time to time split and divide on particular issues. They may both from time to time fall into inconsistencies, failing to adhere to their essential motives and life

principles. All sorts of departures and variations occur. But this remains the normal division and alignment. One may prefer, with Mr. Bryce, to call one party the party of order and authority and the other the party of progress. But the choice of words is not particularly important. The general character of the division is fairly well indicated by either set of terms.

I have elsewhere ventured to argue that Mr. Bryce and de Tocqueville, and other foreign observers as well, have erred in denying that the two great American parties have stood, on the whole, for this normal party division, and I still hold that opinion. But I admit freely that none of our parties has stuck steadfastly to its proper rôle. Apart from the forces that ordinarily make against consistency in politics, the Federal form of our Government has been the cause of a long series of divisions—divisions over the powers of the States and of the Nation—that have often obscured the more universal division. Now and then these old questions—questions of State rights and Federal powers—reappear. But they have lost their heat. They have lost much of their interest. There is something academic about all the present-day discussions of them. I think it is clear that they now play a far less important part than they used to play in our polities, and have much less effect than formerly on our party divisions. These may, therefore, be expected to follow hereafter more closely than they have hitherto followed the general usage of parties in representative governments. One will stand rather more distinctly than formerly for order, authority, system, effectiveness; and that will be the party through which privilege will most naturally seek protection and extension. The other will rather more distinctly than formerly stand for democratic aspiration, for the rights and the hopes of the individual, for equality of opportunity; and that will be the party which on the whole will offer the most antagonism to privilege.

But of the two great parties now in existence, which will be which?

Until quite recently, I do not think many of us would have hesitated on this point. Although the Republican party began as the party of freedom, of manhood rights, and in opposition to one of the worst forms of privilege that ever existed, the institution of slavery, I think most of us would have said that in its later history it has been pretty distinctly the party of order

and authority in this country, and therefore the party to which privilege would most naturally look for favor and protection. It has had that character for several reasons. It has had a majority of the wealthy in its ranks, and it has naturally been more responsive to their views than its rival. It is the party to which people who have had, as the saying is, a stake in the country have naturally gravitated; and one potent reason for their coming into it has been its long ascendancy, the long lease of power which the country granted it after the Civil War. It has had control of the Government. Strong, successful, practical men have turned to it because it could do things, and men of that character have become its ruling spirits. Great interests of all kinds have attached themselves to it. As it gradually committed itself to the policy of protection, those who profited or hoped to profit by that policy became inseparably attached to it. As the issues which it was formed to meet disappeared its character changed. It became more and more the champion of the great interests which filled its campaign chest and demanded in return the legislation they wanted. A more thoroughly business-like party never existed. It has for decades commanded the best practical ability in the country. As our industrial system altered, when first the great corporations were formed, and then the trusts, until from many fields competition disappeared, nothing was more natural than that the men at the head of the great combinations should find this party sympathetic. They were the same kind of men, not infrequently they were the same men, who were already dominant in its councils. Both from its composition and from its association with great business interests, the Republican party was apparently certain to become the political representative of the new order; the representative of power; the representative of wealth; the representative of combination as opposed to competition, of co-operation and co-ordination and system as opposed to individualism; the party, therefore, of privilege—of the new kind of privilege.

Certainly, its rival was not well fitted for that rôle. The Democratic party had, it is true, at a certain time in its history, stood for a great special interest. The long lease of power which it enjoyed before the Civil War had the usual effect of power on a party of liberal principles. It grew more complacent with things it had come into existence to oppose and less fiery for the ideas

it had come into existence to advance. It became more complacent with authority, less fiery for liberty. The genuinely democratic impulse which it had received in Jefferson's time and again in Jackson's had no renewal under Polk and Pierce and Buchanan. While it was in this state the slavery issue came to dominate all others; and both the old parties divided over it. The Whig party went to pieces. Among the Democrats, the Southern or pro-slavery faction got the upper hand and kept it until the disruption of 1860. Unfortunately, two truly democratic principles, the principle of individual liberty and the principle of local self-government, both thoroughly sound within reasonable limits, had been brought, by the anomalous fact of slavery in a republic, into a kind of conflict. The distracted party held to the principle of local freedom, of State rights, and abandoned the principle of individual liberty, of the rights of man. The slavery interest, the very greatest single interest in the country, for a time controlled it. For a time, therefore, it may be said to have been the party of the established order, the party of privilege.

But for the last half-century the Democratic party has had very little of the power that corrupts and demoralizes. Neither has it had the kind of membership that would make it complacent with privilege, nor yet have the great material interests attached themselves to it. It has, indeed, from time to time won as recruits independent men of wealth; but its principal gains have been among the working-people of the great cities, particularly among the foreign-born and among the plain farmers of the West. The old slave-holding interest of the South has, of course, disappeared, and the large Southern membership of the party has had, since the war, an influence on its policy very different from that which the slave interest exercised before the war. For the South has been poor; it has been relatively weak; it has felt itself on the defensive, on the outside of things and not on the inside. In the South, moreover, the plain man, the man with neither wealth nor distinction of birth, has been steadily coming to the front. The old Southern aristocracy has lost its political ascendancy, and the new industrial oligarchy has been slower to develop there than elsewhere. The voice of the South in that party has accordingly been, since the war, the race issue alone apart, decidedly against any kind of condoning of privilege.

On the whole, therefore, I think we may say that as the new issues began to force themselves upon the country, as the great changes in our industrial system came about, and the new kind of privilege began to make itself felt and understood, it was decidedly the Democratic party to which one had best reason to look for opposition to that new kind of privilege. That was the party which seemed, on the whole, to have decidedly the best right to claim support as the party of individual liberty, of democracy in the full meaning of the word.

And that, I think, has been its real bent. For the past ten years its specific proposals have been, for the most part, unfortunate. It has suffered also from bad management, from bad organization, from factional divisions. It has suffered from lack of intelligence. As contrasted with the business-like control and direction of the Republican organization, its leadership has been pitifully weak. The party has been distrusted, and the people have refused to grant it power, because they have felt it to be incoherent, unbusiness-like, ineffective, more like a mob than an army—but not because it has not been democratic in animus and temper and composition. For years, in fact, it has wanted only able and intelligent leadership and firm organization to commend it to popular favor. A majority of the American electorate would many times have preferred to support that party if they had not been afraid to.

Such, then, was the general state of both parties when the new aspect of industry and finance forced itself upon the attention of the people in a way to demand a distinctly political attention. Then two things happened which have profoundly altered the party situation. One was Mr. Roosevelt's promulgation of what have come to be called the Roosevelt policies. The other was the Progressive or Insurgent movement in the Republican party.

The two things were certainly not unrelated. Which began first will doubtless in the future be discussed by historians, but to determine whether ex-President Roosevelt really got his cue from the Western Progressives or they got theirs from him is not of the first importance. Both he and they had come to feel that to retain the confidence of the country their party must somehow counteract the impression, already wide-spread, that it was subservient to great private and corporate interests; that it must,

therefore, strike out on a new line and consider more candidly the changed conditions of industry. Both he and they had vision enough to see that there was growing up and becoming powerful in this country a kind of discontent somewhat different from that which has produced most of the revolutions and political overthrows of the past; a discontent not so much with actual as with relative material conditions, not so much with actual suffering or poverty as with inequalities, and particularly inequalities of opportunity.

The fact and the volume of that discontent in America is a striking and a creditable thing. Many of our people who are most dissatisfied are living fairly comfortable lives. They do not lack bread or shelter. They have work, and their earnings seem, as compared with the earnings of the same kinds of labor in other countries, decidedly high. But they see other men enjoying not merely greater wealth, but a kind of power which they themselves cannot hope to attain. They perceive that they are mere parts of systems, the control of which has passed to a few men; that these systems are growing constantly bigger and absorbing more and more of the industrial energy of the country; that it is, therefore, no longer reasonable, as it once was, for every man of character and intelligence and energy to hope to make himself the independent master of his own business, whatever it may be. Instead of that, they find all the main industries, including the various forms of commerce, tending to combination and consolidation, with a very small group in control, and the workers of all but the highest grade or rank deprived completely of initiative, and indeed reduced to be mere parts of a great machine, valueless and powerless if detached. Of course this change has caused some actual hardship. But the discontent with it has been something more than a mere clamor for a bigger share of the good things of life. The democratic instinct, the instinct and principle of individualism, of independence, of human rights, has been at the bottom of it. That instinct has taken alarm, and the alarm has spread through both the parties. The reason why this feeling has had more striking and visible effects in the Republican party than in the opposition has been that it had more to overcome in that party than in the opposition.

Whether we give the credit for originality in this matter, for first perceiving the coming on of a new democratic impulse, to

ex-President Roosevelt or to the Western Progressives, whether we consider that he acted as patriot and leader and prophet or only as an astute politician, there can be no denying that his political instinct was keen and correct. But ex-President Roosevelt, when he went out of office, had merely announced a general policy concerning the combinations and had done little more than that concerning the conservation of our resources. And even in his very general announcements of policy he on one point either differed from the Western Progressives or at least failed to go their lengths. He made no attack on the system of high protective tariffs. He failed, therefore, to strike at all at that particular bond between his party and the great interests which many have regarded as the least defensible of all. The Western Progressives did strike at it, and it was that part of their programme which, as we all know, brought them first into open conflict with the conservative wing of their party.

That conflict has now widened and deepened into a positive breach or schism which cuts through the party everywhere except, perhaps, in the South. The division has, for the time being, altered the face of American politics, and it has upset all calculations and forecasts.

To attempt a forecast even of the course of the schism itself would be venturesome. But either the Progressives or the Conservatives will win, let us say, in their present fight for control inside the lines of the party lines. If the Progressives win, the party will be profoundly changed. But in that case the chances are at least even that the Conservatives will not withdraw; they may feel that they have no other place to go; and if they remain in the party their presence will be enough to keep it from becoming radical—to keep it from becoming more than moderately liberal. If, however, the Conservatives win, the Progressives are not so likely to acquiesce and remain loyal. On the contrary, there is a very strong probability that they will secede; that they will either attempt a new movement and organization of their own or join with the present opposition or some part of it. It is a question, therefore, whether they or the present Democratic opposition will be the true liberal party of the future. But to that liberal party of the future, whatever form and name it may take, both the Progressive Republicans and the present opposition will contribute of their membership; and, on the other

hand, we may be sure that wherever, in the new alignment, the Conservative Republicans, the so-called "Stand-patters," the men who for some decades have been the real rulers of this country—that wherever these shall find themselves, there will be the party of authority and order, the party of the new kind of privilege. To them will doubtless be joined many conservative men, Tories in temperament or by conviction or from the character of their personal interests, who now call themselves Democrats. The composition of the two parties of the future seems in fact fairly easy to predict.

But whether they will be two new parties, with new names, or merely the two old parties materially changed in composition and much more sharply differentiated in policy than they now are—that depends on the character and the effectiveness of the leadership of the immediate future. A leader of the Republican Progressives comparable to Hamilton or Jefferson or Lincoln could in all probability make of them a true and complete party, so strong that a great part of the opposition would in the long run be drawn into its ranks. The rise of such a man among the Democrats would, on the other hand, probably have a precisely contrary effect.

There are people, many people, who feel that the Republican Progressives already have such a man. There are also people, though not so many, who would contend that the opposition has such a man; and the claims of this sort that are made for Bryan are as sincere as those that are made for Roosevelt. But they are not at present taken so seriously. It is said that Mr. Bryan has been for years proclaiming the issues and advancing the ideas which are now transforming our politics; that he was in this respect far in advance of Roosevelt. This is measurably true. There are demands in the Progressive programme, there are "planks" in Roosevelt's Ossawatomie "platform," which were urged by Mr. Bryan before the terms "Progressive" and "Insurgent" came into use, before Roosevelt became President and announced his policies. But along with these things Mr. Bryan has put forth other ideas, other proposals, which have been utterly and deservedly rejected; and he has supported them with a kind of reasoning which many of us find not merely shallow and unconvincing, but culpably sophistical. Whatever sincerities and whatever soundness there may be in him, a great body of

thoughtful and sober-minded Americans, many of them members of his own party, are fixed in the conviction not merely that he is an untrained mind, a mind lacking in judgment as well as training, but that he is too unstable to be trusted with power. It is hardly conceivable that his prestige and his hold on public opinion will ever be greater than they have been. They are now less than they have been; and they seem likely to continue to diminish.

With Roosevelt it is different—very different. He still fills the public eye as no other man of the time has done. Apparently, his going out of office has not lessened at all the interest in his personality and his career or at all narrowed his extraordinary access to public opinion. It is many years since any American has had so great a fame as his or such obvious and wide-spread influence. Every public utterance he makes reaches the entire country. He can have an instant hearing for any proposal, any contention, he cares to put before the Republic. Moreover, he plainly desires to continue to lead. He seeks to put himself at the head of the Progressive Republicans; and all the signs are that the majority of the Progressive Republicans wish him for their leader. When, therefore, it is asked, why he is not the man of the hour, the man of the age, the man providentially raised up to be the captain of all the forces of democracy in the warfare against the new kind of privilege, a convincing answer does not at once frame itself.

He will not fail to play that rôle from any lack of energy or of shrewdness or of the instinct for affairs—the instinct of leadership. No more skilful politician, in the full and not invidious sense of that much-abused word, has ever lived in this Republic, if in any Republic. It is by no means preposterous to compare him with either Caesar or Napoleon if one has in mind only their civil and not their military characters and careers. Neither in revolutionary France nor in the overgrown and decadent Roman Republic could such a man have been kept down. His detractors merely hurt their case when they refuse to acknowledge the uncommon force there is in him. In face of his actual performance in self-advancement, it is difficult to doubt that he possesses “the thews that throw the world.” Perhaps it is true that he has no particular gift or power which can properly be called genius; that he has won his battles solely by an extraordinary use and

development of gifts not extraordinary in themselves. But that does not leave him any the less extraordinary in the actual effect. Such will and energy are themselves as rare as genius—and far surer to prevail. It is they, in truth, that make the conqueror as we know him in history; and that is plainly the type to which Roosevelt belongs. His sleepless ambition and ever-growing egoism are entirely in keeping with it. The frail body disciplined to robust strength and hardihood, the student and idealist turned into the ultra-practical man of affairs, the halting speaker and writer become a monopolist of public utterance, the appetite for action and for power, once aroused, growing ever with what it feeds on, until it is become insatiable—what is all this but the normal course and development of the character that all through history has belonged to the setters-up of dynasties, the regenerators or overthrowers of kingdoms, the founders or the subverters of republics?

Fairness will concede extraordinary attraction as well as extraordinary force. There have been admirable, even noble, impulses, the gift of comradeship; zest in human relationships, and love of nature, and joy in life; integrity in private dealings, and continence, and domestic virtues. There has been, of course, courage always and an inspiring sense of opportunity and of the range and possibilities of life. There has been a ceaseless intellectual activity, never, it is true, particularly fine or original, but keen and quick and wide of reach, playing over the entire field of human interests. It is a personality that can win as well as overcome.

Yet I cannot feel, and I do not believe that many dispassionate and painstaking observers of this career can feel, that here is the right leader of our American democracy in its present crisis. Many, on the contrary, are coming to feel that in precisely such a man there may be more immediate danger to the American democratic ideal than even in those new industrial forces against which his leadership is invoked. It is becoming a commonplace that those forces and our present industrial conditions were not contemplated when our system was founded; that the fathers did not foresee them and could not, therefore, set up safeguards against them. But the fathers were not without forethought of the danger of the coming of such a man as is now risen up among us—a man too popular, too powerful, and too ambitious. It is

clear from their debates that they had in mind both the mis-adventures and the preventive usage of the ancient and mediæval republics, in every one of which there dwelt a constant terror of the man too long in power and in the public eye, the man with too great a following, the man too pre-eminent above his fellows. It was of the essence of the spirit of the ancient republics, as it was of the spirit of Republican Florence, not to expect to find the virtue and forbearance of their great men equal to their strength, and to refuse, therefore, to risk the safety of the State upon the doubtful hazard of the conflict of ambition and patriotism in any human breast. Our own founders limited the term for which a President could be elected to four years, and they also undoubtedly intended the device of an electoral college to operate as a check upon popular impulse. That device failed. But when Washington retired at the end of his second term his example was quickly seized upon and converted into a precedent —a precedent which has hitherto proved strong enough to keep any of his successors from serving longer than he did.

That precedent has undoubtedly had great weight with the electorate, but it has also had the effect of an admonition and an appeal to Washington's successors themselves; and to not one of these has it ever appealed so logically as it does to-day to Theodore Roosevelt. All that I have said and all that can be said, in praise of his character and his achievement, merely makes it so much the more applicable to his case. For the kind of danger contemplated in the apprehension which has made that precedent so effective could not come from a weak man, but only from a strong man; it could not come from an unpopular man or a man generally distrusted, but only from a man grown too popular, a man trusted too widely and too slavishly. Of course, too, the man to be feared must be ambitious, and that Roosevelt has from first to last been keenly ambitious even his admirers do not deny. He has proved himself not merely ambitious, but of an imperious and arrogant impatience with whatever hinders or stays him, whether it comes from men or from laws. With men he has again and again displayed, now a tyrannous and coarse violence, now an indirection and sharp practice, which simply cannot be condoned. However one considers such things as his dealings with Quay and Platt and Harriman, or his brutal fury with his critics of the press and with Judge Parker and other

political rivals, or his entire behavior concerning campaign contributions in 1904, or the bullying and unfairness with which he has repeatedly met opposition, one's republican instincts and one's instincts as a gentleman are equally outraged. With laws he has been even more high-handed than with men. From first to last he has been egregiously lacking in that scrupulous and reverent sense of law, of precedents, of institutions, which has been hitherto the rule of both American and English statesmanship, and none of his public utterances shows the lack of that sense more glaringly than his recent setting forth of the "New Nationalism." Of all his predecessors in the White House only Andrew Jackson can be compared to him in this respect. And Jackson, demoralizing as his "reign" was, never was half so really dangerous. For Jackson had no such consuming ambition, no such sweeping designs of change; and when he came into national power he was already elderly and infirm. Should Roosevelt again take the first place in the Republic, no one would expect to see him conduct himself as an ordinary President in time of peace. His power would be greater than Jackson's at its height; and there is every reason to believe and none to doubt that he would wield it with a worse than Jacksonian disregard of legal and constitutional limitations.

One may have the firmest faith in our system and still shrink from submitting it to such a strain. No doubt, Lord Morley's observation in "Compromise" is sound: A reasonably healthy state has immense strength; it has abundant reserves of vitality to throw off disease and recover from shocks and confusions and derangements of its order. But every departure from its right order, every lapse from its essential principles, leaves it more open to the next. I do not believe that Roosevelt, I do not believe that Napoleon or Cæsar, could in a day or a generation subvert the institution of this country; but not for that reason ought a Napoleon or a Cæsar to be welcomed; and not for that reason should any intelligent American disregard the danger that there is in Roosevelt.

Clearly, unmistakably, the precedent we have made from Washington's example is apposite, applicable. The warning of it comes home. It warns us against him. But may we not hope that also, since he also is an American, since we need not believe that he does not really love his country, it will in time, and

potently, warn him against himself? That he will yet, and in time, take to heart some of the words forever on his lips, and read aright the lives he has so often commended to us—Timoleon's, Hampden's, Washington's, Lincoln's? That he will learn at last the supreme nobleness, rise to the supreme opportunity, of self-abnegation? That the ideals of youth will yet revive in him and conquer the coarser impulses of manhood? That he will yet, and in time,

“Curb the liberal hand, subservient proudly”?

By no conceivable self-assertion could he now render to his country such a service as it is open to him to render by crucifying his own ambition; and in no other way could he make his own fame so secure. Nor would the act cut him off from such service, such leadership, as would in truth be most truly valuable to the country and most honorable to him. Let him once pledge himself in plain words never again to seek or to take the Presidency, and his power to advance causes, his hold on public opinion, his opportunity to contribute what he has to contribute to the solution of the new problems, would not be less, but greater. If, however, he will not do that, his leadership, so far from helping us with our new perplexities, will merely complicate them with the old problem and danger which from time to time has beset every experiment in republican government—the problem and danger of “the man on horseback.”

We shall proceed better, because more safely, more in accord with the spirit of our own and the English law and usage and institutions, with less risk of either destroying what we have or establishing what we shall have to destroy, if we go on without recourse to anything at all in the nature of a dictatorship. Our emergency is not of the character that demands such a remedy; nor could such a remedy work us any lasting good. Our need is of a permanent adjustment to conditions likely to endure; of laws thoroughly considered and carefully framed; of deep-reaching changes in our social habit and usage—such changes as can only be brought about slowly, with a wise patience. For work like that such a temper as Roosevelt's would be almost the worst conceivable. That of his successor, though less inspiring, is far better. But it is doubtful if any one man's leadership will bring us far upon our road. For the long and hard enterprise now be-

fore democracy in this country the best abilities of many men will be needed, and those abilities will need the best training to be got from schools and colleges and from life and experience. There must be an extraordinary co-operation, a difficult and unprecedented bending of countless energies, in many fields, to the same general and impersonal ends. Ordinary popular leadership will not suffice; from the one-man power in whatever form, from masterful and swift determinations of whatever kind, we have little to hope. American politics are become a hard occupation. The Republic has never before demanded a more serious and patient attention to its affairs, or from so many men. For, whatever the changes that shall in the end make our system valid and firm against the new conditions, they must extend through the whole of it, in all its Federal vastness. The test to which our public opinion and our great electorate are thus submitted is no less than this: that there must be a wide-spread, an intelligent, and a stubborn patriotism.

The demand of the Republic for many men who shall be not merely patriotic, but of a high intelligence and highly trained, who shall combine common honesty with shrewdness and insight, is indeed severe. And for the difficult service demanded the reward may not be high. It may well be martyrdom instead of gratitude; to be misunderstood rather than to be honored; to be used and then cast aside.

But the immemorial promptings to nobleness abide. It is, after all, service and not self-seeking which oftenest in the end prevails. Though many men who seek only their own advancement or their own profit in this country's affairs win to their goals and have their low desire, they and their works pass swiftly.

“ In the unscarred heaven they leave no wake.”

They who, on the other hand, give themselves sincerely to the common service—and they, too, are many, for it is not for nothing that we have been so long a free people in a favored land—will find that what they have wrought will stand; that it has been as if some gracious and tutelary power guided their hands to noble and enduring workmanship. They will find—as good men always find in the end—that they have builded better than they knew.

WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN.